

These Days . . . Can We Win a Race?

By George E. Sokolsky

STATINTL

THE EVIDENCE of survival; the evidence of victory is in the attainment of goals and purposes. In our conflict with Soviet Russia, it cannot be said that we are succeeding or failing because we have not stated our goals and purposes; we have not made it clear that we have any

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or want any. Instead, it would appear that we are playing along by ear. From Roosevelt through Eisenhower, ours has been an exercise in opportunism and we have survived.

However, the arms race is a practical factor in the battle for survival from two standpoints:

1. The actual accumulation of the means of destruction and defense in such quantities and efficiencies that there can be no doubt as to eventual victory;

2. What will such preparedness do to our economy; what will it do to our social and political institutions? How much can we afford to expend of our national wealth before we are forced to lower our standard of living?

Senator J. W. Fulbright, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, has said:

"The answer, of course, is policy. We must develop policies against which we can properly evaluate our initiatives and our responses to critical events. We must also develop style."

It is a little late in the game to develop policies. We have been engaged in an effort to establish world leadership for years. During that period, changes have been wrought in human institutions such as have not been made in a thousand years or more. Do we move like an inhuman juggernaut, not knowing where we go, responding to challenges by enormous efforts and then subsidizing to lick our wounds?

THIS IS NOT functioning according to policy as the Monroe Doctrine, the Hay Open Door Policy, the freedom of the seas, which were specific American policies to which we adhered rigidly.

The functioning of the State Department during the first half year of the Kennedy Administration has been without style as Senator Fulbright defines it. The fault has been in the President's desire to assemble as much talent as he could get to work under one roof.

But he brought together too many men who regard themselves of equal rank and wisdom. Thus the President and Secretary of State have been faced by the private views of Chester Bowles, who regards himself as an expert on Asia, although his only relationship to that continent has been a short tenure as Ambassador to India. There he fell under the mystic spell of Nehru, whose concern is India, not the United States.

Just as Bowles has been confusing American policy toward Asia, so must Allen Dulles of the CIA assume full responsibility for the Cuban fiasco. Just as Anthony Eden resigned when the Suez fiasco brought obloquy upon his government, so Allen Dulles should have resigned when the activities of the CIA regarding Cuba proved to be amateurish and ridiculous.

THERE CAN BE in excess of talent. That is why no symphony orchestra is made up of concert artists, each one of whom plays according to his own interpretation. Such an orchestra would sound like a collection of madmen as that, of course, is what happens when too much talent is brought together under the roof of the State Department.